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Jensen: Allied Strategy in World War II: The Churchill Era, 1942-1943

II
allied strategy in world war 11
1945
the churchill era 1942 1943
DE LAMAR JENSEN

one of the disillusioning though awakening

shocks which
comes to students of recent history is the discovery after stag-

gering through mountains of patriotic oratory and propaganII
da that the british and american allies in world war 11
were not quite so united in marching ahead together in a
noble brotherhood of arms as is generally supposed the
wartime alliance of the major powers of great britain the
united states and soviet russia was undoubtedly the most
spectacular and effective military team ever thrown together
in modem
modern times but it was neither a simple nor a natural
combination the differences in traditions motives philosophy
organization and resources were enormous and at times appeared insurmountable yet the common threat of nazism
was so great and so immediate that a working coalition or
more correctly several working coalitions eventually brought
an allied victory and an end to one form of totalitarian dictator ship
tatorship

this

working alliance among the three principal allies was
not achieved by a single major compromise but by a constantly
shifting set of compromises and adjustments which in the
overall view resulted in british military strategy predominating
in 1942 and 1943 followed by russo american strategy in
1944 and 1945 it is the purpose of this and a subsequent
article to critically examine the nature justification and results
of these policies and particularly the factors responsible for
the dramatic shift in strategy which took place late in 1943
1

jensen is associate professor of history at brigham young university
this study is in two parts the second of which will appear in the next
issue of BYU studies in an article entitled
tehran the turning point in
allied strategy
or as general wedemeyer more descriptively put it the virtuoso
churchill led the anglo american orchestra although we furnished practically
general albert C wedeall of the instruments and most of the musicians
new york henry holt 1958 p 170
meyer wedemeyer reports

dr

49
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1I
when the military events of 1941 caused britain russia
and the united states to become active military partners in the
war against the axis powers the sharp divergence of their
respective philosophies of warfare soon became apparent the
british and american views in particular reflected two very
distinct traditions of offensive strategy each with impressive
precedents dating back not only to clausewitz and napoleon
but evento
even to julius caeser and alexander the great
the british belief as might be expected from their worldwide interests and involvements was that primary attention
should be given to softening up the enemy through indirect
attacks upon supply lines communications and weak spots
before a direct frontal assault should be risked strength
should be distributed according to this view between several
different targets with emphasis being placed upon flexibility
and expediency rather than upon the classical imperatives of
mass and concentration the most outspoken proponent of this
peripheral warfare was the prime minister himself winston
churchill 2 although the majority of the chiefs of staff were
generally of the same opinion 3 the disastrous experience of
world war 1I where britain suffered 200000 casualties in a
on at the
single day in the attempt to meet the germans head
headon
western front certainly gave support to this view
the american military experience and psychology had been
very different without the worldwide commitments and freaction
quent involvement in military altion
ltion which the british empire
required the americans attitude toward war was that it
should be fought wholeheartedly and ended quickly this
american conception of all out war or all out peace was foreign
to the british who for centuries had never known either the
US approach meant massing as many men and as much equipment into the battle as fast as possible and striking directly at
the heart of the enemy it required a concentration of effort
11

see his summary statement on strategy in churchill the world crisis
18 28 also harvey A de
london thornton butterworth 1923 vol 11
ap 1828
II pp
weerd churchill lloyd george clemenceau the emergence of the civilian
makers of modern strategy military thought
in edward mead earle ed
ap
from machiavelli to hitler princeton princeton university press 1944 pp
287
305
287305
see arthur bryant s the turn of the tide garden city doubleday
1957 and victory in the west 1959 based on the diaries of field marshall
Alanbrooke chief of the imperial general staff passim
lord alanbrooke

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol5/iss1/6

2

Jensen: Allied Strategy in World War II: The Churchill Era, 1942-1943

II
ALLIED STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR 11

51

adherence
and the adherance
adhe rance to a specific well prepared plan this
philosophy affirms that the total manpower loss will be less
than in a drawn out peripheral war and that the conflict will be
considerably shortened the american strategy was closely
akin to that of germany and the russian too was related to
it in many respects as we shall subsequently see
these were the opposing views which after december 7
1941 had to be reconciled into a working coalition 4 prior to
the american entry into the war the military staffs of both
countries had exchanged enough information and advice to be
rather fully aware of the obstacles ahead yet they had also
reached substantial agreements as to the overall grand strategy
and priority of theater operations 5 both countries agreed that
hitler was the greatest immediate threat and that the safety
of both atlantic communities depended upon his defeat when
the japanese struck at pearl harbor churchill was fearful that
the american reaction might be to turn full attention to the
pacific and leave britain to face the european fortress alone
it was this fear coupled with the apparent doom of russia
and the practical need to formulate concrete immediate plans
that sent mr churchill speeding to the united states seven
days after pearl harbor
11
II
as
1941 14 jan 1942
on ference 22 dec 194114
the arcadia Cconference
the first full scale wartime meeting of the two powers was
called 6 made some general decisions involving the overall
conduct of the war such as the reaffirmation of the priority
A very fair and moderate description of the conflicting anglo american
II can be seen in hastings lionel ismay the memoirs
strategy in world war 11
248 52
pp
ap 24852
of general lord ismay new york the viking press 1960
et passim
see in particular mark skinner watson chief of staff prewar plans and
II the war department
preparations united states army in world war 11
vol 1I washington DC historical division department of the army 1950
edwinn M snell strategic planning for
410 maurice matloff and edw
pp 367
ap
367410
coalition warfare 194142
II the war
1941 42 united states army in world war 11
III washington DC office of the chief of military histdepartment vol 111
ill
lii
lil
gerory department of the army 1953 pp
ap 32
62 and louis morton
3262
many first the basic concept of allied strategy in world war 11
II in kent
command decisions washington DC office of
roberts greenfield ed
pp 11
the chief of military history department of the army 1960 ap
47
1147
see ray S cline washington command post the operation division
II the war department vol 11
in united states army in world war 11
II
washington DC office of the chief of military history department of
pp 8789
the army 1951
ap
ap
87 89 and matloff and snell strategic planning pp
119
97
97119
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of the european theater 7 the creation of a unified command 8
and the agreement that allied troops should launch some sort
of major offensive against germany in 1942 beyond that
agreement was much more difficult to reach when the two
staffs moved from the realm of general pronouncements into
the arena of specific plans of operation their differences
quickly came into focus first the british presented their plan
of operation which included a naval blockade of europe
strategic bombing of key cities and industries and strengthening the ring around germany by sustaining the russian
front by arming and supporting turkey by increasing our
strength in the middle east and by gaining possession of the
whole north african coast this was all to be followed by
limited moves on the european continent itself in 1943 preferably from the mediterranean into southern europe or from
turkey into the balkans and finally with its success guaranteed an invasion of germany 9
for their part the american chiefs of staff could not
accept the british plan and cautiously advanced their own
belief that as soon as possible we musts
must come to grips with the
enemy ground forces

they agreed reports morison

that a tight blockade
must be maintained and that the sea lanes must be kept open
but nobody could figure out how a succession of hit
and run raids around the ring of hitler s festing
fesiung europe
festung

this

was only reluctantly accepted by admiral king the newly appointed
commander in chief united states fleet who three months later also became
chief of naval operations and most of the naval staff who especially after
the humiliation of pearl harbor were less than enthusiastic about maintaining
only a holding action against japan until germany had been defeated see
ernest J king fleet admiral king A naval record new york W W nortpp 36064
360 64 and robert E sherwood roosevelt and hopkins an
on 1952 ap
445 46 and cf willpp 44546
intimate history rev ed new york harper 1950 ap
co
operation and
iam hardy mcneill america britain and russia their cooperation
III
1941 46 vol 111
1939 46 ed by
conflict 194146
ill
lii
lil
ili of survey of international affairs 193946
arnold toynbee london and new york royal institute of international affairs by oxford university press 1953 p 93 ff
his was a move considered vital by general marshall but which rethis
ceived stiff opposition and considerable modification before it was accepted
pp 45557
455 57 george C marshall the
cf sherwood roosevelt and hopkins ap
winning of the war in europe and the pacific biennial report of the chief
of staff of the united states army july 1 1943 to june 30 1945 to the secrenew york war department
tary of war hereafter cited biennial report
by simon and schuster 1945
p 8 and henry L stimson and mcgeorge
bundy on active service in peace and war new york harper 1947 ap
pp
15
413
41315
memo br csofs
osofs amer csofs
osofs
22 dec 41 sub ABC 337 ARCADIA
2 as detailed in matloff and snell strategic planning p 101
24 dec 41
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could bring victory any nearer to us this seemed a strategy
of weakness something to be done to keep your spirits up
when you could do nothing better the american idea was to
begin immediate planning and preparing for a massive assault aimed at the heart of germany this incidentally had
been the american strategy in world war 1I at a time when
many british leaders preferred to get at germany by some
back door 11

from churchill s point of view the first major joint anglo
american operation should be the invasion and occupation of
french north africa general marshall and his aides were
emphatically opposed to such an obvious diversion of their
forces away from what they considered the primary goal
the assault on hitler s europe 11 but since no american count
er plan had as yet been prepared marshall was happy to have
the conference adjourn without making any more binding
commitment than the agreement that a north african operation would be studied logistically
for the next two years anglo american relations were
dominated by the issue of a mediterranean vs a european
concentration of allied power during which time the prime
minister succeeded through diplomacy cajolery and ultiintebruary and
matum in making his strategy prevail 12 in february
samuel eliot morison strategy and compromise boston little brown
p 24
1958
general arnold was among the american opponents of churchills
churchille
Chur
chills
african strategy the way to win the war he insisted is to hit germany
where it hurts most where she is the strongest right across the channel
H H arnold global mission new york harper 1949 p 303 secretary of
war stimson and others were equally strong in their opposition to the british
plan see stimson s confidential letter to the president 27 march 1942 in on
18
ap 417
active service pp
41718
12
churchill s ability to put teeth into his convictions soon became well
known to the americans who negotiated with him when marshall king and
hopkins flew to london in july they informally talked with some of the
british general staff before calling upon churchill at chequers and reaped
as a result the now notorious tongue lashing described by captain butcher in
the following words
the PM prime minister had raised holy hell with
harry because the precise protocol of calling upon the prime minister first had
for some reason not been followed
the PM had declared in most vigorous
language as he strode up and down the room at chequers that he was the
man to see first that he was the man america should deal with and that the
british army navy staffs were under his command and to emphasize his
authority he read from a british book of war laws and
as he read each
page tore it from the book and threw it on the floor harry C butcher my
Elsen
eisen hower the personal diary of captain harry C
three years with eisenhower
butcher USNR naval aid to general eisenhower
hower 1942
new york
Elsen dower
elfen
1945
19421945
24 25 hopkins described the event this way
pp
ap 2425
simon & schuster 1946
the prime minister threw the british constitution at me with some vehemence
goo
goosevelt
Koo
sevelt
koosevelt
teveit and hopktevelt
winston is his old self and full of battle sherwood moo
loosevelt
hopkin
ins s p 607
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march general marshall and the american joint chiefs of
staff completed with the war plans division after march
changed to the operations division and headed by general
Elsen
eisenhower
eisen
hower their plan of attack against germany briefly
this marshall memorandum as the operational plan was popularly called proposed a rapid and concentrated build
up of men
buildup
and materiel in england operation BOLERO for the purpose of a full scale cross channel invasion in the spring of
1943 operation ROUNDUP this was to be supplemented
by a previous probing attack in western france in september
1942 operation sledgehammer involving american as
well as british troops by this plan the allies would be able to
strike at the heart of germany much sooner and more effectively than if they followed churchill s north african approach to europe via the rugged mountains of either italy or
the balkans 13 president roosevelt was generally in agreement
with the philosophy of his military advisers but for some
months there were also vigorous claims made by various groups
and individuals for alternative operations the most persistent
on the american side being for the pacific theater by may
however the president was convinced that the marshall strategy was the one to pursue yet above all he insisted american
forces must engage the german enemy in europe before the
year ended 1 I regard it as essential he affirmed in a strongly
worded statement to his advisers that active operations be
macht had launched its
conducted in 1942 14 by then the Vehr
wehrmacht
Wehr
vehrmacht
webr
spring offensive on the russian front and it was not at all
certain that it could be stopped stalin was desperately calling
for a second front in europe
in the meantime hopes for coordinating the american
strategy with the british were growing slimmer early in april
marshall biennial report report on the army 1 july 1941
30 june
194130
114 20 dwight D
pp
ap 11420
1943 washington DC infantry journal 1943
pp
eisenhower crusade in europe garden city doubleday 1948
ap 4247
42 47
marshall memorandum 2 april 1942 operations in western europe exec 1
OPD files dept of the army the operational designations were not given to
the american plan until later the memorandum marshall presented to churchill
contained the essence of these three operations without their code names
see churchill the hinge of fate vol IV of the second world wur
war
iffar boston
wat
Rep oits
16 also wedemeyer reports
houghton mifflin 1950 pp
ap 9798
ap 314
olts pp
97 98
31416
ap 416
132
20 and from the opposite point
38 stimson on active service pp
41620
13238
of view field marshall sir alan brooke in bryant turn of the tide pp
ap
80
277
27780
memo FDR for SW coas
cofs arnold SN king and hopkins 6 may
42 WDCSA 31 SS as quoted in matloff and snell strategic planning pp
ap
221 22
22122
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general marshall accompanied by wedemeyer and chaney
and the president s chief civilian aide harry hopkins travelled
to london to present the american plan to the prime minister
and his chiefs of staff 1 I recall vividly general Weder
neyer
wedemeyer
later reported this initial joust with the british concerning
definitive plans for a cross channel operation for it was the
forerunner of many discussions with the americans always
keeping uppermost in mind the basic idea of concentrating and
making a decisive effort against the heartland of the enemy
the british on the other hand kept returning to a concept of
scatterization or periphery pecking with a view to wearing
down the enemy weakening him to a point which would permit almost unimpeded or undisputed invasion of fortress
europe by our forces 15 the mission eventually seemed to be
a success though ending in a tentative british acceptance of
the marshall memorandum yet skeptical of the means to carry
it out 16
but the appearance of solidarity behind the BOLERO
ROUNDUP plan was shortlived when general eisenhower
Elsen
eisen hower
formerly chief of the US operations division and now commander of the european theater of operations arrived in
britain in june he found that little if anything had been done
there to expedite the cross channel assault 17 and learned furthermore that numerous other operations such as a pas de
calais crossing or a norway invasion were being considered
instead soon lord louis mountbatten
Mountbatten chief of combined
operations was on his way to washington to soften up the
american president and the joint chiefs of staff for the forthcoming announcement by churchill that operation sledgehammer at least would have to be abandoned
the sudden activity of general rommel in northeast
africa made consideration of a joint mediterranean offensive
imperative in mid june churchill himself arrived at hyde
park to discuss with the president the advantages ofa
of a north

african operation in

1942

which came to be known as

wedemeyer reports p 105

As marshall s planner
wedemeyer relates
and as a personal believer in the principle of going for the enemy s
jugular vein 1I was continually called upon to challenge british periphery
pecking concepts of strategy ibid 132 cf marshall winning of the war
in europe and the pacific biennial reports 194345
1943 45 p 8
igiibid
161
pp 634
ikid
38
bid
63438
bis 119 sherwood roosevelt and hopkins ap
ap 53
Elsen hower crusade pp
eisen
eisenhower
5344 trumbull higgins winston churchill
and the second front new york oxford university press 1957 p 136
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TORCH churchill the master diplomat was at his best as
he expounded the merits and urgency of the operation 18 the
inadequacy of landing craft especially he insisted although
there were many additional drawbacks in effect eliminated
any possibility of a cross channel attack in 1942 knowing how
strongly roosevelt felt about launching a major operation
somewhere before the year had ended and preferably before
the general election in november churchill played persuasively upon the mediterranean theme the fall of tobruk
bobruk to rommel on 21 june could scarcely have been better timed to give
validity and urgency to the prime minister s words if it had
been planned by the combined chiefs themselves
the next few weeks were crucial as proposals and19counter
proposals filled the air on both sides of the atlantic in the
end a combination of roosevelt s anxiety to place american
forces in action against germany in 1942 and churchill s
vigorous championing of operation TORCH carried the day
roosevelt s capitulation to churchill is anticipated in his informal instructions of july 15 to general marshall prior to the
latter s departure for london
even though we must reluctantly agree to no sledgehammer in 1942 1I still think we should press forward
vigorously for the 1943 enterprise I1 see nothing in the meswarmness on their
lukewarmness
sage from england to indicate any luke
part for the 1943 enterprise I1 am somewhat disturbed about
this readiness to give up 1942 will they also give up 1943
maln point is that 1I do not believe we can wait
but my main
until 1943 to strike at germany if we cannot strike at
sledgehammer then we must take the second best
and that is not the pacific there we are conducting a suc

on the military

conclusions of this meeting see churchill the hinge
84 and king A naval recoi
ap 383
ap 395
of fate pp
96 the best defense
38384
39596
decoi
record4 pp
of the american plan was presented in a brief to the president by secretary of
war stimson on 19 june see stimson on active service pp
ap 420
23
42023
see some of churchill
church11 s communications to the president in churchill
pp 43441
434 41 according to stimson general marshall was
the hinge of fate ap
so upset at the reopening of discussions that for a time at least he almost
favored shifting american priority to the pacific 1 I found marshall very stirred
up and emphatic over it he is very naturally tired of these constant decisions
which do not stay made this is the third time this question will have been
brought up by the persistent british and he proposed a showdown which 1I
cordially endorsed As the british won t go through with what they agreed to
we will turn our backs on them and take up the war with japan diary entry
of 10 july 1942 stimson on active service p 424 stimson subsequently
explains that neither of them really intended to do this it was rather their
feelings about what ought to be done to bluff the english into agreement with
BOLERO cf marshall biennial reports 19431945
1943 1945 p 9

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol5/iss1/6

8

Jensen: Allied Strategy in World War II: The Churchill Era, 1942-1943

II
ALLIED STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR 11

57

cessful holding war troops and air alone will not be decisive
at once it requires the increasing strength of our navy
which takes time
if sledgehammer cannot be launched then I1 wish
a determination made while you are in london as to a specific and definite theatre where our ground and sea forces
can operate against the german ground forces in 1942 the
theartres
the atres to be considered are north africa and the middle
theatres

east 20

by the end of july sledgehammer had been scrapped
in favor of a north african campaign and although he consoled the americans that ROUNDUP would not be affected
churchill knew very well that any full scale operation in north
africa would delay a cross channel invasion at least six months
and perhaps much longer the prime minister was right As
the commitment of men and equipment to the mediterranean
theater increased during the next year BOLERO and ROUNDUP were both sacrificed on the north african altar
meanwhile russia was stepping up her appeals for the
opening of a second front in western europe and by late
spring had been given some reason to believe that it was forthcoming in the course of conversations with mr V M molotov
in washington at the end of may and beginning of june full
understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of
creating a second front in europe in 1942 according to the
official US announcement 21 churchill partially countermanded this assurance a few days later however when molotov
stopped at london on his return to russia 22 but still breaking
the news to stalin now particularly after the recent conclusion
of an alliance treaty between the soviet union and great
britain would not be an easy task
early in august churchill flew to moscow to present the
verbatim notes of the conversation taken down by harry hopkins
marshall
sherwood roosevelt and hopkins p 602 on the marshai
marshal I king hopkins
ap 399409
talks in london see ibid pp
602 12 king A naval record pp
399 409
ap 60212
ap 2533
butcher my three years pp
25 33 and from the opposite side churchill
ap 34147
441 48 and bryant turn of the tide pp
ap 44148
341 47
the hinge of fate pp
department of state foreign relations of the united states diplomatic
papers 1942 washington DC government printing office 1961
vol
11
61 569
ap 559
II pp
1942
70 57577
575 77 and 58283
582 83 hereafter cited dipl
56970
55961
dial papers 19421
ap 59394
and particularly the white house press release of 11 june pp
593 94
cf also arthur bryant the turn of the tide p 314
22
pp 34142
341 42 cf sir llewellyn woodward
churchill the hinge of fate ap
british foreign policy in the second world war london HMSO 1962
P 197
pfrom
2from
from
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new strategic plan to the russian ruler and his military staff
stalin s reception of the news
new was somewhat less than cordial
for two days the two were locked in heated debate as stalin
accused the prime minister of ren
renewing
reneging
eging on the anglo american
promise to open a second front in europe in 1942 23 churchill
denied that he had made any such promise and stalin countered that the british army was afraid to engage the enemy 24 in
the end it seemed that the now notorious churchillian salesmanship had won out in spite of continued skepticism on the
part of the russian military heads stalin appeared satisfied
with the possibilities of the new alternative in north africa 2
et in churchill s honor the premier
and at a farewell banqu
banquet
banau
himself was reported to have been enthusiastically summarizing the advantages of the plan to his subordinates wendell
wilkie cancelled out some of churchill s success however by
informing stalin during wilkie s visit to moscow in september 1942 that the united states was in favor of a second
front but great britain was not 26 and in an izvestia press
interview published 27 september wilkie further emphasized
the basic american soviet agreement by saying 1 I asked myself what can be the most effective method of winning our
war by helping our heroic russian ally there was only one
answer for me to establish together with great britain a real
second front in europe and within the shortest time our military leaders will approve perhaps the american public will
27
have to prod them a little 1127

ili
ill

111
III

for the next fifteen months the british stategy
stately continued

to

prevail in spite of renewed russian demands for a legitimate
second front and increasing american impatience and despair
over the diversion of so large a quantity of men and equipment
away from what they still held to be their primary objective
according to estimates following the north african landings
alimi
in november the german and italian forces were to be elimi
aide
dide
alde

memoire from stalin to churchill and harriman

1942 p 621

dial papers

harriman to roosevelt 14 august 1942 ibid also churchill hinge of
fare pp
80 cf churchill s report of the meeting to general clark in
ap 478
faie
47880
ap 48
49
mark clark calculated risk new york harper 1950 pp
4849
ap 481
churchill hinge of fate pp
83
48183

dipl
dial
ibid

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol5/iss1/6

papers 1942 p 639
p 647

10

Jensen: Allied Strategy in World War II: The Churchill Era, 1942-1943

11
ALLIED STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR II

59

bated from north africa inside of two months 28 these hopes
nated
soon proved to be too sanguine but while they were still held
the chiefs of the two allied powers met again to determine
the next step in closing the ring
25 january 1943 was an1425
the casablanca conference 14
other churchillian victory in its decision to keep the committed
troops in the mediterranean now that they were there until
further favorable action could be carried out 29 churchill s
greatest fear in december had been that with the cancellation
of sledgehammer and the indefinite postponement of
BOLERO and ROUNDUP the united states might elect to
alter its original strategy and decide instead to concentrate on
japan in the pacific until britain had finished with its playing
around in the mediterranean he therefore assured roosevelt
Elsen
eisen hower that the cross channel invasion had
marshall and eisenhower
build up in england
not been cancelled and that the arms buildup
would continue at top speed but in the meantime he reasoned
the mediterranean forces ought not be allowed to sit idle
they should be used in an invasion of sicily since the allied
occupation of that island would be of inestimable value to their
cause 30 roosevelt hoped for the negotiating help of the russians at casablanca and particularly of stalin himself who the
president knew would also oppose any further delay of the
actual european second front 31 churchill emphatically opposed the idea of a big three conference but was saved the
embarrassment of a riff with roosevelt by stalin s refusal to
attend the meeting 32
churchill s victory at casablanca was almost complete it
now seems obvious that he never intended to return any of the
mediterranean troops to england for a cross channel assault
william D leahy I1 was there the personal story of the chief of
senty
presl
dentY roosevelt and truman based on his notes and diaries
Presi senry
staff to presidents
made at the time new york & london whittlesey house 1950
p 166
sherwood roose and hop p 654
see especially the diary entries of sir alan brooke in bryant turn of the
ap 674
ap 439
59 and churchill hinge of fate pp
95
67495
43959
tide pp
ap 692
ibid pp
93
69293

roosevelt to stalin 2 december 1942 transmitted by ambassador harap 665
derson dipl
66 cf USSR ministry of foreign aff66566
dial papers 1942 pp
airs correspondence between the chairman of the council of ministers of
the USSR and the presidents of the USA and the prime ministers of
great britain during the great patriotic war of 1941
45 moscow foreign
194145
II p 42 hereafter cited USSR
languages publishing house 1957 vol 11
correspondence
stalin s negative reply to roosevelt s invitation was delivered by molotov
the following day ibid p 43 and dipl
dial papers 1942 p666
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but such a disclosure at the time would surely have caused the
americans to withdraw their forces as soon as the campaign
then raging in tunisia was finished instead the prime minister proposed only the invasion and occupation of sicily saying
nothing of italy itself until may when planning for the
sicilian operation was nearing completion and even then he
said nothing of a continued operation into northern italy 33
the only significant concession to american demands was his
agreement to begin a series of offensives in the south pacific
and in burma against the japanese 34
stalin received the news of the decisions at casablanca
with grave misgivings and disappointment as he again appealed to both churchill and roosevelt for an immediate second front 35 on march 15 stalin wrote to churchill
it appears from your communication that anglo american
operations in north africa are not being hastened but are
meanin fact being postponed till the end of april
while germany has succeeded in moving from the west
36 divisions including six ar moured ones to be used against
I1 still regard the opening of a second
soviet troops
1I have studied the
front in france as the important thing
arguments you set out in paragraphs 8 9 and 10 as indicative of the difficulties of anglo american operations in
europe 1I grant the difficulties nevertheless I1 think 1I must
give a most emphatic warning in the interest of our common
cause of the grave danger with which further delay in opening a second front in france is fraught for this reason the
vagueness of your statements about contemplated anglo
american offensive across the channel causes apprehension
which 1I cannot conceal from you 36

but now the western allies were becoming seriously concerned
over the tunisian campaign which in the final phase had become unexpectedly difficult another five months were still
to pass before it would be successfully concluded
ap
eisen
1943 1945 pp
Elsen
hower crusade p 167 marshall biennial report 19431945
eisenhower
9 11
911

memoirs p 287 the deployment of US troops in the spring
Chur chills strategy still
of 1943 vividly indicates the degree to which churchills
churchille
prevailed at that date whereas TORCH originally called for 185000 US
soldiers in north africa there were by then 295000 engaged there while at
the same time instead of the 250000 americans called for in britain there
ap 21213
were only 70000 wedemeyer reports pp
212 13
pp 9496
94 96
USSR correspondence vol 1I ap
ibid 105106
105 106 cf stalin s letters of 16 february and 16 march to mr
56 58
ap 55
II pp
roosevelt ibid vol 11
59
5556
5859
31ismay
smay
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in the middle of may 1943 churchill again met with roosevelt in washington at the important trident conference for
ail
ali
fail
fall
the purpose of working out strategy for the summer and fali
particularly involving the north african forces the essence
of churchill s proposals were 1 1 the formal cancellation of
operation ROUNDUP on the grounds of insufficient anglo
american strength in england and lack of landing craft as
2 the immediate invasion of southern
well as the late date
italy with the north african troops as soon as the sicilian
campaign was completed 3 and finally the attempt to bring
turkey into the mediterranean war on the side of the allies 37
churchill however reluctantly agreed to begin preparations
for a new cross channel offensive in the spring of 1944 or later
operation OVERLORD 38 but insisted on the boldly declared assumption that italy could be knocked out of the war
by the end of summer that for the immediate future the
mediterranean remained the principal objective 39 sir alan
brooke probably expressed churchill s sentiments when he told
Elsen
eisenhower
hower that he would prefer eliminating the cross channel
eisen
project entirely 40

before the sicilian venture was completed churchill had
succeeded by the astute use of pressures and appeals to the
mediterranean commanders in winning tacit acceptance of his
ap 808
11
784 811 et passim esp pp
ap 784811
churchill the hinge of fate pp
80811
ap
10 11 and ismay memoirs pp
ap 1011
marshall biennial report 194345
1943 45 pp
ap 50216
296
502 16 with wede98 also cf brooke in bryant turn of the tide pp
29698
166 67
ap 22834
ap 16667
228 54
34 and eisenhower crusade pp
meyer wedemeyer reports pp
22854
sir frederick morgan was put in charge of planning the operaltsee general
li
morgan overture to overlord garden city doubleday 1950
tion
ap 158
62 and gordon A harrison cross channel
also leahy 1I was there pp
15862
II the european theatre of
attack in united states army in world war 11
II washington DC office of the chief of military histoperations vol 11
ap 46
82 this had actually been deory department of the army 1951 pp
4682
cided upon at casablanca but progress was still slow by july the outline plan
was ready for presentation to the combined chiefs and in august it was approved at the quebec conference detailed tactical planning was initiated
Eisen
Elsen
howers own story of the war new york arco publishing co 1946
eisenhowers
elsenhowers
p 1
39
churchill made enough trouble at this conference that his own chief of
the imperial general staff became rather exasperated
and winston wrote
brooke in his diary thinks one thing at one moment and another the next moment at times the war may be won by bombing
at others our main effort
must be in the mediterranean directed against italy or the balkans alternately
with sporadic desires to invade norway and roll up the map in the opposite
direction hitler did but more often than all he wants to carry out all operations simultaneously irrespective of shortage of shipping
there are times
arnes
es me to desperation
when he drin
drnes
bryant turn of the tide p 513
cde p 167
crusade
eisenhower Crus
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plan to invade southern italy and move rapidly up the peninsula to rome the inference then was that after the fall of
redeployed
italy the mediterranean forces could be re
deployed to assist in
the invasion of france this was in harmony with general
marshall s determination to avoid the creation in italy of a
vacuum into which the resources of the cross channel operation
would be dissipated 41 it soon became apparent however that
the prime minister had no intention of removing the men
from the mediterranean but planned instead to use them in
an invasion of the balkans through yugoslavia the culmination of his cherished soft underbelly approach to europe 42

thus through the summer and fall of

1943 churchill s

mediterranean strategy was continued though not without
strong opposition from american planners and commanders
who could see by the time of the next major conference of the
allies at quebec quadrant conference in august the very
real possibility of a cancellation or postponement of the spring
1944 cross channel offensive 43 operation OVERLORD was
given first priority over future mediterranean projects at the
quadrant conference 44 but with the slowing progress in italy
after the initial landings marshall feared that churchill would
use this situation to further delay OVERLORD therefore the
american planners became more adamant in their insistence
that more troops be released from italy to take part in the invasion of france it was also decided by roosevelt and
churchill that the entire cross
cros channel operation should be
commanded by an american general rather than a british 45
1943 45 p 11
marshall biennial report 194345
wedemeyer reports pp
ap 22834
228 34 cordell hull the memoirs of cordell
II p 1231 ralph ingersoll asserts
hull new york macmillan 1948 vol 11
that the decision to continue northward up the italian boot was made solely
by churchill without consultation or conference ingersoll top secret new
york harcourt brace 1946 p 61
Elsen
eisenhower
eisen hower crusade p 168 wedemeyer reports pp
ap 235
43
23543
ismay memoirs p 310 harrison cross channel attack pp
ap 83
100
83100
john ehrman grand strategy vol V august 1943 september 1944 history
of the second world war united kingdom military series ed by J R M
8 10
butler london HMSO 1956 pp
ap 810
stimson on active service in reference to the british attitude toward
the second front stimson reported to the president though they have rendered lip service to the operation their hearts are not in it and it will require more independence more faith and more vigor than it is reasonable to
expect we can find in any british commander to overcome the natural difficulties of such an operation carried on in such an atmosphere of his government p 436
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during september and at the moscow conference of foreign
ministers in october 46 churchill put up further arguments in
favor of an extended operation in italy north of rome which
was still much further away from grasp than even the most
bad anticipated and the possible use of these same
pessimistic had
troops across the adriatic 47 the deadlock over this point of
mediterranean vs european strategy was still unbroken when
the three heads of state met together at tehran on november
27 1943 for their first and most crucial conference
see department of state bulletin vol IX no 226 23 october 1943
p 271 no 228 6 november
p 319
pp
ap 30711
307 11 no 229 13 november
pp
and esp no 230 20 november
ap 341
45
34145
ap
284 99 hull memoirs vol 11
pp 28499
II pp
churchill closing the ring ap
1274
91 general john R deane the strange alliance new york viking
127491
press 1947
26 herbert feis churchill roosevelt stalin the war
pp 13
ap
1326
they waged the peace they sought princeton princeton university press
pp 53121
pp
ap 22334
223 34 and especially ehrman grand strategy ap
1957
53 121
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